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1. Introduction 
What is the relation between models, as used in model-theoretic semantics, and the 
"world" which models represent? More specifically, let us consider the question of 
whether a single individual, event, time or other element in a model might be used to 
represent more than one individual, event, time or other object in the real world. 
It should be understood that the question here is not whether groups of 
objects may be represented with some sort of "plural individual" in the style of Link 
( 1983); rather, the idea is to use a model in which pragmatically irrelevant distinctions 
between individuals are ignored, so that the model "conflates" more than one real­
world entity into a single model-theoretic entity, representing them as though they 
were the same object. This idea was argued for most explicitly and systematically, to 
my knowledge, in Nunberg (1984); though related ideas have been hinted at or 
suggested briefly or casually in a number of other places. 
The present paper provides arguments against this technique, as developed by 
Nunberg, and suggests an alternative approach to dealing with cases where the 
distinction between real-world individuals is pragmatically ignorable, based on the 
device of "Pragmatic Halos" presented in Lasersohn ( 1999) . 
In considering this issue, we will also have to consider exactly what the point 
is of using models in model-theoretic semantics; and although this seems like a very 
elementary issue, and one which lies at the foundation of our whole technique, I think 
it is still an issue about which there is a great deal of obscurity and differences in 
thinking. To a surprising degree, semanticists often use essentially identical 
formalism, yet understand that formalism very differently. 
2. The Same - Yet Somehow Different 
Nunberg points out that there is an interesting flexibility in the interpretation of 
adjectives such as same and different. For example, Sentence ( 1 )  can mean either that 
Enzo now drives the very same car token as I used to drive, or that he drives a car of 
the same type as I used to drive - presumably meaning in this case, a car of the same 
model, or the same year and model : 
( 1 )  Enzo drives the same car I used to  drive. 
A similar effect may be observed in Example (2), which can mean either that Enzo and 
I drive the very same car token, or just that we both drive Ford Falcons: 
© 2000 by Peter Lasersohn 
Brendan Jackson and Tanya Matthews (eds), SALT X 83-97,  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. 
84 Peter Lasersohn 
(2) I drive a Ford Falcon. Enzo drives the same car. 
Lookingjust at examples like these, the most natural analysis would probably 
be to claim that noun phrases like the same car are ambiguous, between a reading 
requiring token-identity, and a reading merely requiring type-identity, and 
paraphrasable as something like "a car of the same type." 
But as Nunberg points out, an analysis which appeals to this kind of ambiguity 
faces a number of difficulties. First, and most interestingly for our purposes, it seems 
to leave as a mystery why it is that you cannot say something like (3) :  
(3) ? A Ford Falcon was heading south on u. s .  1 0 1 ,  went out of control, and 
crashed into the same car. 
It would make perfect sense to say that a Ford Falcon went out of control and crashed 
into a car of the same type, but for some reason you cannot use the phrase the same 
car here to mean "a car of the same type." It' s  a very interesting fact. 
Second, we find examples like (4), which I have altered slightly from 
Nunberg' s  original example: 
(4) Otto has been carrying around the same book as he voted to ban last year. 
If this use of the same depends on a type-token ambiguity in the noun phrase, it 
should make sense to ask which reading we have in this sentence. But of course what 
Otto voted to ban was a type, and what he has been carrying around is a token, so it 
doesn't seem that we can't make a coherent choice here without saying something 
extra. 
Neither of these, perhaps, is really a knock-down argument, and it is easy to 
imagine analyses of (4), at least, that explain it by positing hidden operators that shift 
between types and tokens. It is less clear that such an approach can explain the oddity 
of (3), however; and in any case Nunberg offers a different kind of analysis, which 
seems to me, at least, to be more interesting and more explanatory than just positing 
hidden operators - or at least it would be if it worked. 
3. Constructing Individuals on a Pragmatically Limited Property Set 
Nunberg' s analysis is based on the idea that assertions of sameness or difference are 
always made relative to some particular conversational purpose, and that distinct 
objects may sometimes be equivalent to one another in their contribution to that 
conversational purpose. For example, in comparing the body styles of different cars, 
one Ford Falcon is as good as another, since they all have identically styled bodies; 
so in a conversation on this topic we might count all Ford Falcons as equivalent to 
one another and hence refer to any of them as the "same car" as the others. 
In contrast, ifwe are trying to determine who has responsibility for an accident 
in which one Ford Falcon crashes into another, this is a conversational purpose for 
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which identical body styling does not produce pragmatic equivalence, so we would 
not refer to two Ford Falcons as the "same car" in such a conversation. 
Nunberg suggests that what makes two objects equivalent for a particular 
conversational purpose is that they differ only with respect to properties which are 
irrelevant to that purpose. Ford Falcons differ from one another in all sorts of ways: 
color, location, age, etc . ;  but it is easy to imagine conversations in which all these 
properties are irrelevant to the issues at hand. 
Therefore, Nunberg suggests, in giving a model-theoretic semantics for such 
discourses, we might employ models in which these pragmatically irrelevant 
properties are simply not represented. 
And this is not too surprising an idea. It is commonplace to assume · that 
quantificational sentences, for example, are interpreted relative to a domain of 
quantification from which pragmatically irrelevant individuals are excluded; and of 
course each model has a domain of quantification as one of its main components, so 
we may regard the intended model of a given discourse as not representing 
pragmatically irrelevant individuals. 
Likewise, we might suggest that pragmatically irrelevant times, or events, or 
whatever, are not represented - and in this light, a suggestion that pragmatically 
irrelevant properties not be represented seems very natural. 
Now, Nunberg suggests, we can "eliminate the universe" in the manner of 
Keenan (1 982) - that is, we don't represent individuals as primitive elements of our 
models at all, but define them in terms of properties. The technique is well-known: 
Intuitively, we just replace each individual with its extensional property set. (Of 
course technically, we don't start with the individuals and then replace them; we just 
start with the properties, assume boolean operations on them, and then define an 
individual as a proper principle ultrafilter in the resulting algebra.) 
The upshot of this is that any number of distinct individuals in the intuitive 
sense might correspond to a single individual in the technical sense. In particular, if 
two individuals differ from one another only in pragmatically irrelevant properties, 
those properties don't get represented in the relevant model and aren't used in the 
constru,ction of "individuals" in that model; the real-world individuals might have 
precisely the same set of pragmatically relevant properties, and therefore correspond 
to the same ultrafilter - that is, the same individual, in our technical sense - in the 
model-theoretic representation. 
Now, Nunberg suggests, we just define the words same and different as 
requiring sameness and difference at the level of model-theoretic representation - in 
effect allowing us to refer to distinct real-world individuals as "the same X" in cases 
where they differ only in pragmatically irrelevant properties, but prohibiting us from 
doing so in cases where the individuals differ in some respect which is relevant to our 
conversational purpose. 
It is now possible to see why (3) is anomalous. Nunberg suggests that the 
kind of discourse where one might expect a sentence like this to occur - say, a police 
accident report - would normally be a discourse in which the distinction between the 
two cars is crucial to the conversational purpose - which might be, for example, 
determining responsibility for the accident . That is, the cars differ in some 
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pragmatically relevant property, so they would be represented by different property 
sets in the model, so the use of same is not licensed. 
Nunberg points out some interesting additional patterns in number 
morphology that might find an explanation in an analysis along these lines: For 
example, consider Example (5) : 
(5) Otto saw an interesting book in Dalton' s window yesterday; when he got 
home, he discovered that Arabella was giving the same {book / ?books} as 
Christmas presents. 
Here, even though Arabella is giving out multiple copies ofthe book, the more natural 
phrasing is with the singular noun. Why? On Nunberg' s analysis, we can attribute 
this to the fact that the appearance of the word same in this example indicates that all 
those books are represented model-theoretically as a single individual. If instead we 
just interpreted same as meaning of the same type, there is no reason why we should 
expect that the same books in this example would be any more anomalous than books 
of the same type, as in (6), which is perfectly acceptable: 
(6) . . .  he discovered that Arabella was giving books of the same type as Christmas 
presents. 
Nunberg even seems to imply that the same kind of analysis should explain the 
definiteness of the phrase the postman 's leg in Example (7) : 
(7) My dog bit the postman' s leg. 
Of course the postman probably has more than one leg, so why the definite here? The 
idea seems to be that the distinction between the two legs is not pragmatically 
relevant, so they can get represented by a single individual in the model - and it is at 
this level that the uniqueness presuppositions for definites gets satisfied. 
It' s worth noting in this connection that noun phrases with same are required 
to be definite, as shown in (8). 
(8) a. The same X 
b. *A same X 
4. Models as a Level of Representation 
Nunberg' s analysis is challenging, and interesting from a broader theoretical 
perspective, because it seems to turn models into a significant level of representation, 
whose relation to the world they represent is not particularly direct or straightforward. 
In this view, the "individuals" in a model, even in the relevant, intended model for a 
particular discourse, are not identified with the real-world individuals we talk about, 
nor do they even stand in one-one correspondence with those individuals. Instead, 
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a substantive issue arises about which individuals in the model correspond with which 
individuals in the world, and this correspondence relation becomes something we need 
to study and theorize about, rather than something trivial and automatic. 
In fact Nunberg goes further, and suggests that if we adopt this view of 
models, the reconstruction of individuals as property sets becomes superfluous - once 
we regard individuals in a model as representations of real-world individuals rather 
than as the real-world individuals themselves, we can return to the idea of treating 
them as formally primitive if we want, so long as they are differentiated only by 
pragmatically relevant properties. 
Nunberg' s  analysis is, perhaps, an extreme case, but analogous ideas corne up 
in a less dramatic way with some frequency. For example, Link: ( 1 987) outlines a 
technique for dealing with issues of "granularity" in the representation of events. 
Issues of this kind corne up, for example, in defining aspectual classes. 
Take the case of Mozart' s death, described in (9) : 
(9) Mozart died on the 5th of December, 1 79 1 .  
In most respects, die behaves like an achievement verb, describing an atomic event 
with no temporal parts. But as Link: puts it, "There is ' "  a level of description on 
which Mozart' s death is composed of a more or less complex series of events, e.g. , 
the physical processes involved in his dying." 
Link: therefore suggests that we employ a whole series of different event 
lattices, each one displaying the part/whole structure of events at a different 
granularity of representation. Homomorphisms map the more coarse-grained 
structures into the more fine-grained structures, so that whatever structure exists at 
the coarser levels is preserved in the finer levels .  But it is entirely possible that an 
element might be atomic at a coarse level of representation, even while its image 
under one of these homomorphisms might have proper parts at the finer levels of 
representation. 
Although Link: does not formalize this system in much detail, the idea seems 
to be that these event lattices should be components of our models, in the usual sense 
from model-theoretic semantics. It seems, then, we must regard the event lattices in 
our models as representations, whose relation to the real events and part/whole 
structure they represent may not be particularly direct or straightforward. 
A related perspective is laid out in some detail in Zimmerman ( 1 999). 
Zimmerman writes (p. 540) : 
"" . the individuals [in models] are objects of pure set theory and do 
not lead lives in any literal sense. Similarly, the situations are 
abstract objects of set theory and none of them coincides with an 
actual situation. Of course, these abstract objects can and should be 
thought to represent individuals and situations, but it is important to 
realize that they are neither. " 
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Once we regard the individuals and situations in a model - even the "intended" model 
of a particular discourse - as representations, the issue naturally arises of how to 
relate them to the real individuals and situations they represent, and Zimmerman 
discusses this in some detail. For entities with names, we let the real bearer of the 
name correspond to the object assigned as the denotation of the name in the model; 
and for objects without proper names, we set up the correspondence by relating them 
to objects with names, as in ( 1 0), which relates people 's  noses to their model­
theoretic representations. (Here Mo is one of the intended models for English, with 
sets of individuals Do and situations So, and interpretation function Fo; , � ,  represents 
the correspondence relation between model-theoretic objects and the real-world 
things they represent.)  
( 1 0) For any individuals x, situations s and Mo-entities x E Do and s E So: 
if x � x and s �s, then Fo(nose')(s)(x) � x's nose in s. 
Once we recognize the need for correspondence rules of this sort, the argument goes, 
meaning postulates become otiose, and the role of models in semantic theory becomes 
very limited. 
There is nothing here about model-theoretic entities corresponding to multiple 
real-world entities, but the fundamental perspective of model-theoretic entities as 
representations is a crucial part of the argument. 
But what reason do we have for thinking of models in this way? I share many 
of Zimmerman' s concerns about models and meaning postulates, but I think this 
question of correspondence between model-theoretic entities and their real-world 
counterparts is a red herring. 
I suspect maybe some people would justify the representational view of 
models this simply: Models are ordered pairs, or n-tuples of some kind; the real world 
is not an ordered pair or n-tuple; therefore models are at best only a representation 
of the world, not the world itself And once we start thinking of models as 
representations, it seems almost automatically to open these issues concerning the 
representation relation that lead to concerns of the type that Zimmerman expresses. 
However, there is a big difference between saying that models are 
representations, and saying that the elements of which models are composed are 
representations. 
If we define a model as an ordered pair containing a non-emp� set and a 
function meeting certain conditions, then any non-empty set and any function meeting 
those conditions will qualify. I, for one, have no problem with the idea of real, 
concrete, physical objects being members of sets, and so some of our models will have 
real, concrete, physical objects as members of their domains, and not just "abstract 
objects of pure set theory." Ifwe can accept this, then there is no obstacle to the idea 
of a model whose interpretation function assigns basic expressions the things they 
really denote, and not just abstract representations of those things. In fact I would say 
that there will be such models, and that the whole question of how to fix a 
representation relation between model-theoretic entities and their real-world 
counterparts is a spurious issue. 
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None of this says anything against the idea that there is a level of 
representation which intervenes between expressions in a language and their 
denotations in the world - something like Discourse Representation Structures, for 
example. But I think it is a serious mistake to think of model-theoretic denotations 
as playing that role. There really is a major difference here, even though people 
sometimes talk about Discourse Representation Structures as "partial models." There 
is some justification to this kind of terminology, but Discourse Representation 
Structures don't play at all the same role in semantic theory that models classically 
play - that is, they don't play the role of M in definitions like ( 1 1), for logical 
consequence: 
(1 1 )  q> i s  a logical consequence of", ifffor all M: if", is  true in  M then q> i s  true in 
M. 
I assume this is what we mean by a model - it' s something that plays the role of M in 
this sort of rule; and unless we make use of this sort of rule, explicitly or implicitly, 
there is no point in using models in the first place. 
If we were just defining truth, for example - ordinary truth, not logical truth 
- we would have no motivation for considering the denotations of expressions across 
a range of models. We might still relativize denotations to times, worlds, or other 
indices, but there would be no reason to bring models into the picture at all - we 
would just assign truth values based on the denotations which expressions actually 
have relative to those times, worlds, or other indices. This is the technique in Lewis 
( 1972), for example, and many other places. 
In fact, even if we are concerned with entailment relations, and not just truth, 
we can define some kinds of entailment modally, in terms of the inclusion relation on 
sets of possible worlds, again without bringing models into the picture. We really 
only need to appeal to models if we are concerned with defining a logical consequence 
relation which differs in some relevant respect from the modal necessitation relation 
- for example if we think of logical consequence as licensing arguments based 
specifically on their syntactic form. 1 
But if there is no motivation for using models when our main concern is just 
with truth, or with modally-definable entailment, there certainly can't be any 
motivation in such cases for exploiting a putative distinction between an expression's 
denotation in a model, and the real-world entity or entities that that model-theoretic 
denotation represents. 
Of course, whatever ontological assumptions we need to make in the 
assignment of ordinary truth values will have an effect on how we construct models, 
once we turn to the definition of logical consequence and related notions; I 'm not 
trying to argue against that. But the reverse kind of case - where the denotation of 
an expression relative to a model is different from the denotation we would assign if 
we were not using models - that kind of case, it seems to me, can only be motivated 
on the grounds that it is needed for the definition of logical consequence, logical 
equivalence, logical truth, and so on, and not in the analysis of ordinary truth and 
falsity. 
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It is interesting to note in this respect that Nunberg' s original analysis of same 
and different was entirely motivated by problems in the ordinary assignment of truth 
values, not in the definition of logical consequence or other logical notions - in fact, 
logical consequence is hardly mentioned in the whole article. So methodologically, 
I don't think there is any reason to appeal to models in developing a solution -
certainly no reason to appeal to distinction between model-theoretic denotations and 
their real-world correspondents; and any solution which crucially makes such an 
appeal is on shaky ground. 
5. An EtTability Problem 
Of course, the argument just given is made on a purely conceptual, methodological 
basis, and may not be convincing to semanticists who don't already share the same 
methodological assumptions. After all, part of Nunberg' s point seems to be 
methodological, and if we regard his paper primarily as an argument for a particular 
methodological approach in constructing models, we can hardly argue against it 
simply by assuming the kind of methodology he argues against. 
So let us tum now to a different problem, of a more technical nature, which 
I think will pose trouble for Nunberg' s analysis even if we concede this use of models 
as appropriate. 
To review: the basic idea is that the domain of properties in a model is 
pragmatically limited in the same way as the domain of individuals usually is in more 
conventional models, so that only pragmatically relevant properties are represented. 
Then we use this limited set of properties to individuate our other entities: collapsing 
together all those individuals which share all the same properties (from among those 
represented in the model), and keeping separate those individuals which differ in at 
least one of these properties. 
Of course the denotations of predicates in a given model are also going to 
come from the set of properties represented in the model. And this is what is going 
to cause us problems. Suppose I am the sole owner ofFord Falcon Number One, and 
Enzo is the sole owner ofFord Falcon Number Two. Then Ford Falcon Number One 
has at least one property which is not shared with Ford Falcon Number Two, namely 
Ax[I own x]; and of course Ford Falcon Number Two has a property that is not shared 
with Ford Falcon Number One, namely Ax[Enzo owns xl 
Now, suppose these properties are pragmatically relevant to the issue at hand 
in our discourse. Then these two properties will be represented in the model; the two 
cars will not correspond to the same property set, so they will be represented 
separately, and we should not be able to refer to my Ford Falcon and Enzo's Ford 
Falcon as "the same car." So far so good. 
But now suppose that these two properties are pragmatically irrelevant. In 
this case, they will not be represented in the model. So the two cars will collapse 
together, and get represented with a single model-theoretic individual, which is what 
we want. But, since these properties aren't represented in the model, and the 
denotations for all our expressions have to be drawn from those assigned in the 
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model, we will have no way of expressing these properties. So we should not be able 
to say anything like ( 12), since the italicized portion would have to denote one of 
these unrepresented properties:  
( 12) I own a Ford Falcon. The same car is owned by Enzo. 
But in fact this is a perfectly interpretable, coherent discourse, so it appears that there 
is something wrong. Nunberg' s  analysis predicts that if we refer to two objects as the 
same, we should not be able to express any properties which differentiate between 
them, at least in the same part of the discourse, and that is too strong. 
6. Sameness in a Pragmatic Halos Framework 
Despite the problems discussed above, I think there is something fundamentally right 
about Nunberg' s  analysis - in particular, I will follow him in saying that Enzo drives 
the same car as I used to drive is acceptable, not because of any type/token 
ambiguity, but because, in context, we are allowed to pragmatically ignore the 
distinction between the two cars. The problem is in how we represent individuals 
between which the distinction is being ignored. We should not represent them in a 
way which prohibits all mention of properties which distinguish them. 
Lasersohn (1999) suggested an analysis for a very different kind of case where 
the distinction between objects is pragmatically ignorable, using a rather different 
formalism for representing such cases. Here, I would like to suggest that this 
formalism be adapted for the sort of examples that Nunberg addressed. 
The original concern in Lasersohn ( 1 999) was with examples like ( 1 3)a. and 
b. : 
( 13 )  a .  Mary arrived at three o'clock. 
b. Mary arrived at exactly three o'clock. 
We can certainly say something like ( 13 )a. even if Mary arrived, say, five minutes late. 
But it seems wrong to claim that the sentence is actually true in such a situation. On 
the contrary, the sentence is true only if Mary arrives at three o 'clock; it is false if she 
doesn't arrive till later. 
We can use the sentence felicitously if she arrives at 3 :  05 ,  not because it is 
true, but because certain minor kinds offalsehood are pragmatically permissible. The 
distinction between 3 :00 and 3 :05 may not be relevant to the purposes of our 
discourse, so we can ignore it, counting the sentence as close enough to true for its 
context, even if not really true. 
This raises an interesting puzzle about the difference in meaning between 
( 13)a. and ( 13)b. : If ( 1 3)a. is true only if Mary arrives right on the button, then it 
would seem to be truth conditionally equivalent to ( 13 )b .  But intuitively, there seems 
to be a meaning difference here. The question is how to capture it. 
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I believe that ( 1 3)a. and (1 3)b. are in fact truth conditionally equivalent, and 
that the difference in meaning is not truth conditional, but in the degree of deviation 
from the truth which the two sentences permit without producing pragmatic infelicity: 
( 1 3)a. permits a greater degree than (1 3)b . ,  so ( 1 3)a. can be felicitous even if Mary 
arrives so much later than 3 :00 that (1 3)b .  would be infelicitous. 
Formally, we can account for this by associating with each expression, relative 
to a given pragmatic context, not only its denotation, but also a set of items 
understood to differ from the denotation only in ways which are pragmatically 
ignorable in that context. For example, the denotation of a phrase like three 0 'clock 
will be the actual time, three o'clock, but we also associate with this phrase a set of 
times which differ from three 0 ' clock only in pragmatically ignorable ways - for 
example these might be times just a few minutes before or after three 0 ' clock, or short 
intervals which include three o'clock but also a little time on either side. We can call 
that set the pragmatic halo of the expression. Notationally, we may represent the 
halo of an expression as shown in ( 14) .  
( 14) Hc(a) = the 'pragmatic halo' of a in context C (i.e. the set of things which 
differ from [a]c only in ways which are pragmatically ignorable in 
C) 
In the default case, we can calculate the halo of a complex expression 
compositionally just by applying our normal semantic rules to all combinations of 
elements drawn from the halos of its parts. For example, given some complex 
expression with parts a and �, where the denotation ofthe complex expression is fixed 
by rule as the value returned by applying the function denoted by a to the object 
denoted by �, the halo of the complex expression will be the set of all values returned 
by applying the various functions in the halo of a to the various objects in the halo of 
�, as shown in ( 1 5) .  
( 1 5) Suppose Hc(a) = {f, g, h} and HC<�) = {a, b, c} ,  where by rule: [a�1c = 
[a]c([�]d· Then Hc(ap) = {ita), ftb), itc), g(a), g(b), g(c), h(a), h(b), h(c)} 
This example assumes functional application, but the basic principle can be 
straightforwardly adapted to other sorts of semantic operations as well; see Lasersohn 
(1 999) for details. 
This procedure gives the result that a sentence might have the value 'true' in 
its halo even if it has 'false' as its denotation - this would be the case for ( 1 3)a. , for 
example, if Mary did not arrive at three 0' clock, but only at one of the times in the 
halo of three o 'clock, say, five minutes after three. In such a case, we would count 
the sentence as "coming close enough to true for its context," as indicated in ( 16) :  
( 16) <p comes close enough to true enough for C iff 1 E HC<<p). 
Now we can explain the function of the word exactly in ( 1 3)b. in terms of 
halos. It has no truth conditional effect, so that the phrase exactly three 0 'clock has 
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exactly the same denotation as three 0 'clock. What exactly does is contract the halo, 
so that the halo of exactly three 0 'clock will just contain the actual time three 0 ' clock, 
plus maybe some other very close times, but will not include the more outlying 
elements of the halo of three 0 'clock - for example, maybe not 3 :05 .  As a result 
(1 3)b. may not come close enough to true for its context even in cases where ( 13 )a. 
does. 
Like Nunberg' s  technique, pragmatic halos give us a way to represent 
examples where the distinction between objects is pragmatically ignorable. Unlike 
Nunberg' s  technique, it is relatively silent on the reasons for this ignorability - ifwe 
want, we can retain Nunberg' s idea that only certain properties may be relevant in a 
given context, and that the distinction between individuals that differ only in irrelevant 
properties is ignored - though this is not required by the formalism. 
But even if we retain this idea, it does not commit us to using just a single 
model-theoretic entity to represent multiple individuals; nor does it commit us to the 
claim that any property which distinguishes between individuals is completely 
inexpressible in a discourse which treats those individuals as equivalent. 
F or example, Enzo' s car might be in the halo of my car - but this just means 
that it is included in a set which we associate with the phrase my car - not that we 
represent the two cars with a single individual in the model. And since the two cars 
need not be represented with a single individual, they don't have to correspond to 
precisely the same property set, so we don't have to say that properties like being 
owned by me or being owned by Enzo are simply not represented in the model and 
therefore can't serve as the denotations of linguistic expressions. 
Although this technical problem is eliminated, we do still have the more 
general conceptual or pragmatic problem of why, if these properties are pragmatically 
irrelevant, anyone would bother to mention them, even if they are formally available 
to serve as denotations. I have little to say in this regard, except to suggest that it is 
probably too simplistic to think that we can get away with a simple two-way 
distinction between relevant and irrelevant properties, corresponding to representation 
or lack of representation in our models. Instead, relevance is always relative to a 
particular conversational purpose, and speakers might be pursuing multiple 
conversational purposes at the same time, even in a single sentence, with each purpose 
giving rise to its own sets of relevant and irrelevant properties. Details of ownership 
might be irrelevant in a particular discourse for the purposes of determining whether 
my car and Enzo' s  car count as "the same car," yet still be relevant enough to mention 
for some other purpose, allowing us to say things like I own the same car as Enzo. 
The crucial thing is that even in mentioning ownership, there is no incoherency in 
speaking as though the two cars were identical, whereas we do get an incoherent 
result if we speak as though two cars were identical when describing one as crashing 
into the other, as in (3), since - obviously - a car cannot crash into itself 
It is interesting to note in this connection that the incoherency effect really 
persists only through the clause; after that it becomes possible to refer to the cars in 
a way which absolutely requires them to be distinct, even if they were previously 
described as the same, as in ( 1 7) :  
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( 17) I drive a Ford Falcon, and Enzo drives the same car. His was heading south 
on u. s .  1 0 1 ,  went out of control, and crashed into mine. 
I don't have a detailed explanation for this fact, but suspect that it is a matter of 
presupposition accommodation. The second sentence presupposes there are two 
separate cars; we can accommodate that presupposition, in effect creating a new 
pragmatic context, with its own halo assignments, where the cars are not in each 
other' s halos; and we interpret the second sentence relative to this new context. We 
cannot do the same thing in (3), however, because the clause which describes the 
crash is the same one that describes the cars as the same, and the word same requires 
one car to be in the halo of the other. 
Turning now more specifically to the semantics of same in this kind of 
analysis, I will concentrate here just on problems of the sort Nunberg addressed, 
setting aside the "quantifier dependent" reading of same that Carlson ( 1 987), 
Moltmann ( 1992), Beck (2000) and others have discussed. 
We have a couple of options in formulating an analysis .  Probably the simplest 
one - though probably not the most intuitive one - would be to assume that same is 
indexed to an antecedent phrase, and then define it as in ( 1 8) :  
In fact I think this i s  the semantics most of us  would come up with if we  didn't think 
about examples like Nunberg' s; it requires strict identity, at least as far as truth 
conditions are concerned. So ( 1 9)a. would get the semantics indicated in ( 1 9)b . ,  
assuming for simplicity that the anaphora is  handled by existential closure. 
( 1 9) a. I drive a Ford FalconI . Enzo drives the same I car. 
b. 3x1[ford-falcon 
'(Xl) & drive '(I', Xl) & drive'(enzo ', ty[car'(y) &y = Xl])] 
Of course this requires that Enzo drive the very same car token that I do, 
which is not the reading we're trying to account for. So if we take this option we 
have to claim that in the situation where Enzo drives a physically distinct, but 
equivalent car to mine, the sentence is literally false. Of course if we make use of the 
device of pragmatic halos, it might still come close enough to true for its context -
and we get this effect straightforwardly just by assuming that Enzo' s car is in the halo 
of my car - but in effect we'd be saying that the relevant reading is produced via a 
kind of pragmatic reinterpretation, not as part of the truth conditions. In fact, we 
would be treating this example in completely parallel fashion to Mary arrived at three 
o 'clock - as something that is literally false, but in a minor, pragmatically tolerable 
way. 
This kind of approach might appeal to proponents of Radical Pragmatics, and 
personally, I'm not so sure it ' s  wrong. But it does force a fairly large separation 
between our naive intuitions and the reading which the truth conditions give us, so I 
think it is worth thinking through whether there might be an alternative approach, that 
people with narrower throats than mine could still swallow. 2 
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If the goal is to treat discourses like ( 19)a. as literally true even ifEnzo and 
I merely drive distinct cars of the same type, we can do this by treating sentences 
containing same as involving quantification over the members of the halo of the 
antecedent. That is, even at the level of truth conditions, we have quantification over 
the halo - so in effect, same converts pragmatic "slack" into semantic content. 
As a first attempt at this, we might define same as in (20) : 
(20) samet ' = APAy[P(y) & y  E H(xJ] (where for all contexts C, [HJc = He) 
In effect, this fixes the denotation of same car as the intersection of the set of cars 
with the halo of the antecedent . This would be fine, except that the halo might 
contain any number of cars, so this set might easily tum out not to be singleton. But 
recall the pattern in (8) : noun phrases with same are obligatorily definite. This is 
similar to the pattern in (2 1) ;  noun phrases with only are obligatorily definite (except 
of course in the fixed phrase an only child): 
(2 1)  a .  the only answer 
b .  *an only answer 
I believe the reason for the definiteness is the same in both cases : same, like only, 
should never give us more than a singleton set when it combines with a singular noun. 
Unfortunately, (20) doesn't do that. 
To explain the definiteness here, I will borrow a technique from the approach 
to indefinites presented in Reinhart (1 997) and Winter ( 1997), and suggest that rather 
than simply taking the intersection of the denotation of the head noun and the halo of 
the antecedent, same involves the selection of a particular member of the halo. 
Formally, we represent same using a variable over choice functions, as in (22) : 
(22) samet ' = APAy[CH(f) & P(y) & y = j{H(xJ)] 
(where CH(f) iffVXEdom(f): f(X) E X)  
Here / picks out a particular member of the halo of the antecedent, and - provided 
that thing is a car - the phrase same car will denote the singleton set containing it. 
However,/ should be understood as a free variable over choice functions, not 
as a constant picking out a particular choice function. As a free variable, it gets 
bound by existential closure, with the result that the discourse in ( 1 9)a. gets 
represented as in (23) : 
(23) 3x1J[ford-falcon '(xl) & drive '(I ', Xl) & drive '(enzo ', 1)I[CH(f) & car'(y) & 
y=j{H(xl))])] 
Since different values for/will pick out different cars from the halo ofxb we 
get the effect of existential quantification over the halo, even while guaranteeing that 
the common noun argument to the determiner the will never denote more than a 
singleton set. 
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Admittedly, this is a somewhat artificial means of assuring definiteness, and 
it is perhaps worth noting that our initial definition back in ( I 8) gave this effect 
automatically, without any appeal to choice functions. 
7. Conclusion 
Same expresses identity between an individual in the denotation of its common noun 
complement, and an individual selected from the halo of its antecedent. Since these 
individuals are not conflated in model-theoretic representation, properties which 
distinguish them may still be expressed, and models retain their traditional status and 
use. 
Endnotes 
*Thanks to Chris Barker and to the audience at SALT for useful comments. Errors 
are my own. 
1 From this perspective, an argument like (i) is logically valid because it is of the 
general form in (ii) : 
(i) Every dog is a mammal; 
Every mammal is an animal; 
Therefore, every dog is an animal. 
(ii) Every X is a Y; 
Every Y is a Z; 
Therefore, every X is a Z. 
The form in (ii) is valid because every assignment of values to X, Y and Z which 
makes the premises true also makes the conclusion true. But why pass through the 
intermediate stage of replacing the nouns in (i) with variables? We might as well 
just consider all possible assignments of values to the nouns in (i) directly. In 
essence, this is what I think we are doing in defining logical consequence in terms 
of models; it is a quite different enterprise from checking whether every possible 
world in which the premises are true is also a world in which the conclusion is true. 
For arguments that logical truth is distinct from the necessary truth, see 
e.g. Kaplan ( 1989), Zalta ( 1988). 
2 Intuitions vary somewhat from example to example. Consider the case of my oid 
friend David: He dated a woman; they broke up; when I saw him again a year later 
he was dating a different woman, who resembled the first one to an astonishing 
degree. If this pattern were repeated several times, we might very well say David 
just keeps dating the same woman over and over; but the intuition is that the 
sentence is literally false (albeit felicitous) . 
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